In the early 20th century, the United States grappled with systemic racial segregation, not only in public spaces but also in private property transactions. The Supreme Court case Corrigan v. Buckley (271 U.S. 323, 1926) stands as a significant, though troubling, moment in American legal history, highlighting the judiciary’s role in upholding racially restrictive covenants during the Jim Crow era. This article explores the background, legal arguments, decision, and lasting impact of Corrigan v. Buckley. The case originated in Washington, D.C., where a group of white homeowners in the Bloomingdale neighborhood entered into a racially restrictive covenant in 1921. This private agreement prohibited the sale or lease of their properties to African Americans or other non-white individuals for 21 years. Such covenants were common in the early 20th century as tools to enforce racial segregation in housing, particularly in urban areas experiencing demographic shifts.
In 1922, John J. Buckley, a white homeowner bound by the covenant, sold his property to an African American buyer, Irene Corrigan. Corrigan’s attempt to purchase the property violated the terms of the covenant, prompting other homeowners, led by Helen Curtis and Arthur Corrigan (no relation to Irene), to sue to enforce the restriction and block the sale. The case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, raising questions about the constitutionality of racially restrictive covenants and their enforcement by courts.
The plaintiffs, Curtis and other homeowners, argued that the covenant was a legally binding private contract among property owners. They contended that the court’s role was to enforce the agreement as a matter of contract law, not to question its social or moral implications. They sought an injunction to prevent Buckley from selling the property to Corrigan and to nullify the transaction.
Buckley and Corrigan, on the other hand, challenged the covenant’s validity, arguing that it violated the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, they claimed that:
- Fifth Amendment: The covenant’s enforcement by a federal court in Washington, D.C., constituted a deprivation of property rights without due process.
- Thirteenth Amendment: The Thirteenth Amendment perpetuated a form of servitude by restricting African Americans’ access to property ownership.
- Fourteenth Amendment: Although primarily applicable to state action, they argued that judicial enforcement of the covenant implicated equal protection concerns.
These arguments sought to frame the covenant as not merely a private agreement but as a mechanism of racial discrimination that warranted constitutional scrutiny. On May 24, 1926, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, effectively upholding the racially restrictive covenant without directly ruling on its constitutionality. The opinion, delivered by Justice Edward T. Sanford, sidestepped the substantive constitutional questions raised by Buckley and Corrigan.
The Court reasoned that the case did not present a federal question sufficient to grant jurisdiction. It viewed the covenant as a private agreement among individuals, not an act of the state or federal government. Since the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments apply to government action, not private conduct, the Court held that the enforcement of the covenant by a court did not constitute “state action” subject to constitutional review. The Court further noted that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude did not extend to private agreements restricting property sales. By dismissing the case, the Supreme Court allowed racially restrictive covenants to remain enforceable, reinforcing the legal framework that perpetuated residential segregation across the United States.
Corrigan v. Buckley had profound and far-reaching consequences for American society. By declining to intervene, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the use of racially restrictive covenants, which became a widespread mechanism for maintaining segregated neighborhoods. These covenants contributed to the creation of racially divided urban landscapes, limiting African Americans’ access to housing, wealth-building opportunities, and quality education. The decision also highlighted the limitations of constitutional protections against private discrimination during this era. It reinforced the doctrine that the Constitution primarily restrains government action, not private agreements, even when those agreements perpetuate systemic inequality.
However, Corrigan v. Buckley was not the final word on racially restrictive covenants. Two decades later, in Shelley v. Kraemer (334 U.S. 1, 1948), the Supreme Court revisited the issue and ruled that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants did constitute state action, violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. This landmark decision effectively overturned the practical impact of Corrigan v. Buckley, rendering such covenants unenforceable by courts. Subsequent legislation, including the Fair Housing Act of 1968, further dismantled legal barriers to integrated housing.
Corrigan v. Buckley remains a sobering reminder of the judiciary’s historical complicity in upholding racial segregation. By dismissing the case on jurisdictional grounds, the Supreme Court avoided confronting the moral and constitutional implications of racially restrictive covenants, delaying justice for millions of African Americans. While later rulings and legislation corrected this legal misstep, the case underscores the complex interplay between private contracts, judicial enforcement, and constitutional rights in the struggle for racial equality. Its legacy serves as both a cautionary tale and a call to vigilance in addressing systemic discrimination in all its forms.